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Litigating "Palestine" Before
International Courts and Tribunals: The
Prospects of Success and Perils of Failure
By VICTOR KATTAN*

I. Introduction
One of the purposes of the United Nations (UN) is to bring
about by peaceful means, and in accordance with international law,
the settlement of international disputes.! One such international
dispute, which predates the founding of the UN, is the conflict
between Israelis and Palestinians.2 In May 2011, Mahmoud Abbas,
the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and
President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) also known as
the PA, announced that "this September, at the United Nations
General Assembly, we will request international recognition of the
State of Palestine on the 1967 border and that our state be admitted
as a full member of the United Nations."' Abbas added, "Palestine's
admission to the United Nations would pave the way for the
internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a
political one. It would also pave the way for us to pursue claims
against Israel at the United Nations, human rights treaty bodies and
the International Court of Justice."' The claim that Palestine's
admission to the UN will improve its chances of pursuing legal claims
against Israel before international courts is the subject of this article.
When the UN was founded in 1945, its Charter provided for an
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. This article was
submitted for publication on August 1, 2011.
1. See U.N. Charter, art. 1(1).
2. See VICTOR KATrAN, FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1891-1949 (2009).
3. Mahmoud Abbas, The Long Overdue Palestine State, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/opinion/17abbas.html.
4. Id.
*
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve legal disputes
submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal
questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and
specialized agencies.' Since July 2002, it has also become possible for
states to have recourse to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
complement national legal systems in matters of individual criminal
responsibility.' These are the two main international courts that the
Palestinians could use if their quest for UN membership is successful.
Additionally, if Palestine's UN bid is successful, Palestine could also
avail itself of the conciliation and arbitration services provided by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). In addition to gaining access
to the ICJ, the ICC, and the PCA,' a key explanation as to why
President Abbas laid particular emphasis on attaining membership of
the UN is that Palestine's admission would provide compelling
evidence from the international community that Palestine is a state.
In recent years there has been no shortage of calls to refer
various aspects of the Israel-Palestine conflict to international courts
and tribunals. As one example, in his 2007 report on the human
rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPts),
Professor John Dugard, then UN Special Rapporteur, suggested
asking the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of a
regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and
apartheid.8 In response to that call, two years later, the Human
Sciences Research Council of South Africa published a 302-page
study compiled by a dozen international lawyers on apartheid and
5. See U.N. Charter, ch. XIV.
6. Recourse to the International Criminal Court (ICC) may take place when a
situation has been referred to the court by a state party, when a crime is referred to
the court by the Security Council, or if the Prosecutor initiates his own investigation.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art 13, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.
7. It is important to note, however, that the use of the ICJ's advisory function is
not contingent on Palestine being a UN member, which is why the ICJ was able to
give an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in
the occupied Palestinian territory in June 2004. See Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. No. 131, 136
(July 9),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/-idocket/imwp/
imwp
advisory.opinion/imwp.advisory.opinion_20040709.htm [hereinafter Wall opinion].
8. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, Implementation of General Assembly
Resolution 60/251 of March 15 entitled "Human Rights Council," 1 58-62, U.N. doc.
A/HRC/4/17, 3, 22-24 (Jan. 29, 2007) (by John Dugard).
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colonialism! In that report, the authors proposed that states use the
following question when requesting for the UN General Assembly to
refer the situation in the oPts to the ICJ:
Do the policies and practices of Israel within the Occupied
Palestinian Territories violate the norms prohibiting apartheid and
colonialism; and, if so, what are the legal consequences arising from
Israel's policies and practices, considering the rules and principles
of international law, including the International Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, UN General Assembly Resolution
1514 (1960), the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and other
relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?'o
Under Professor Richard Falk, the current UN Rapporteur, the
calls to refer various infringements of Palestinian human rights by
Israel to the ICJ for an advisory opinion have continued. In his latest
report to the Human Rights Council, Professor Falk suggested the
ICJ should assess allegations that the occupation of the West Bank
and East Jerusalem possesses elements of "colonialism," "apartheid,"
and "ethnic cleansing" inconsistent with international humanitarian
law and self-determination." In this connection, reference should
also be made to the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict ("Goldstone Report"), which was
published in September 2009.12 This report referenced a declaration
filed in the name of the Government of Palestine at the Office of the
Prosecutor of the ICC on January 21, 2009, after Israel was accused of
9. Occupation, Colonialism,Apartheid? A re-assessment of Israel's practices in
the occupied Palestinian territories under international law, HUMAN SCIENCES
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA 294 (May 2009). The study was led by Dr.
Virginia Tilley. The international lawyers involved included Shane Darcy, John
Dugard, Max du Plessis, Fatmeh E1-Ajou, Hassan Jabareen, Victor Kattan, Michael
Kearney, Gilbert Marcus, Stephanie Khoury, Godfrey Musila, John Reynolds, Rina
Rosenberg, lain Scobbie, Michael Sfard, and Peter Stemmet.
10. Id. at 294.
11. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian
Territories Occupied Since 1967, Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other
Occupied Arab Territories,I 32(b) at 17, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/16/72, (Jan. 10, 2011) (by Richard Falk), available at http://unispal.un.org/
UNISPAL.NSF/0/A72012A31C1116EC8525782C00547DD4.
12. Rep. of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights
in Palestineand Other Occupied Arab Territories,U.N. doc. A/HRC/12.48, (Sept. 15,
2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report].
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committing war crimes and crimes against humanity during Israel's
three week assault on Gaza, known as "Operation Cast Lead." 3 The
Goldstone report acknowledged it was for the ICC Prosecutor to
determine for the purposes of its Statute whether Palestine qualified
as a state.14 To that end, the report recommended in the absence of
good faith investigations - which were independent and in conformity
with international standards - the Security Council should refer the
situation in Gaza to the ICC Prosecutor. The report called on the
Prosecutor to make the required legal determination as to whether
Palestine is a state "as expeditiously as possible.""
This Article, after considering the legal avenues available to
Palestinians and assuming that Palestine has standing to appear
before international courts and tribunals, considers the wisdom of the
calls to refer the situation in Palestine to the ICJ and the ICC, and the
likelihood of Palestinian success therein. The success of some of
these endeavors depends on an answer to the question of whether
Palestine is a state. An affirmative answer to the question would
allow the ICC prosecutor to consider the declaration under Article
12(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC
Statute)." The question of whether Palestine is a state, and if so, at
what exact moment it became a state, is however, beyond the purview
of this Article, which is more narrowly concerned with the matter of
litigation." It is not by chance that most of the reports on Palestine
produced by the UN Special Rapporteurs have called on the UN
General Assembly to refer various questions to the ICJ in the form of
advisory opinions. Their preference for advisory opinions can be
explained on the basis that only states can become parties to
contentious cases before the ICJ, whereas no such condition is
attached to advisory opinions, which are given to the UN organ or
specialized agencies that request them.

13. See Victor Kattan Operation Cast Lead: Use of Force Discourse and Jus ad
Bellum Controversies,XV THE PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 95-117 (2009).
14. Goldstone Report, supra note 12, at 590 1 1632.
15. Id. at 548 1767.
16. Indeed, the Prosecutor may feel that his Office is not the most appropriate
authority to determine whether Palestine is a state, which might explain why we have
not heard much on the matter from his Office for the past two years.
17. On the matter of statehood, see generally JOHN QUIGLEY, THE STATEHOOD
OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW INTHE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICr (2010); see also
Victor Kattan Book Review: The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in the
Middle East Conflict 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 407 (2011).
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II. The Various Forms of International Litigation
There are various options available to the Palestinians to have
recourse to international litigation, although most of these options
require that Palestine be considered a state. The possibilities include:
bringing a contentious case against Israel before the ICJ, engaging
Israel in arbitration before the PCA, seeking an advisory opinion
from the ICJ, or bringing a case before the ICC. We know from the
publication of the confidential Palestine Papers that the PLO's
Negotiation Support Unit (NSU) - which is located within the
Negotiation Affairs Department in Ramallah - has in recent years
The
been considering various international litigation options."
Palestine Paperscame into the hands of Al Jazeera and The Guardian

newspaper in January 2011 and included papers assembled over a
decade by the NSU.' 9 The light some of these papers shed on the
practicalities of the Palestinian strategy in seeking recourse to
international courts - referenced below - bears mentioning.

It is worth taking a closer look at the potentiality of bringing a
contentious case against Israel, and whether arbitration may one day
prove to be an option as well before further addressing the ICC, and
the matter of seeking advisory opinions. We know from the Palestine
Papers that in 2009 the NSU produced two memos considering
various international litigation options. The first was entitled,
"Procedures for bringing proceedings before the ICJ and UN
diplomacy," [the UN Diplomacy memo] and the other, "Legal
approaches to be advanced at the ICC in order to protect Palestinian
strategy and realize Palestinian rights and interests"20 [the ICC
memo]. Regarding proceedings before the ICJ, the UN Diplomacy
memo noted that only member states of the UN, and other states that
have become parties to the Statute of the ICJ or have accepted its
jurisdiction under certain conditions, may be parties to contentious
18. See Seumas Milne and Ian Black, Secret papers reveal slow death of Middle
East peace process, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/jan/23/palestine-papers-expose-peace-concession.
19. See Memorandum from Al Jazeera's Transparency Unit on procedures for
bringing proceedings before the ICJ and UN Diplomacy (Oct. 15, 2009), available at
http://transparency.aljazeera.net/files/4883.pdf [hereinafter UN Diplomacy memo
and Memorandum from the negotiations support unit to Palestinian leadership on
legal approaches to be advanced at the ICC in order to protect overall Palestinian
strategy and realize Palestinian rights and interests (Mar. 25, 2009), available at
http://thepalestinepapers.com/files/4494.pdf [hereinafter ICC memo].
20. Id.
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cases. Because "Palestine holds only permanent observer status at
the UN," the memo observed, "it is unlikely that the PLO and the
PNA are able to be a party to a contentious case." While this is true
so long as there is no change in the international legal status of
Palestine, there is the option, albeit remote, of requesting that a third
state bring a claim against Israel on Palestine's behalf where there has
been a breach of a peremptory norm of general international law.
A. Contentious Cases

Under Articles 42 and 48 of the International Law Commission's
Articles on The Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (the Articles on Responsibility), it is possible for an "injured
state" to invoke the responsibility of another state. This can be done
under Article 42 if the obligation breached is owed to the state
individually. Alternatively, responsibility can also be invoked if the
breach is of such a character as to radically change the position of all
the other states to which the obligation is owed with respect to the
further performance of the obligation.21 In the case of Article 48, any
state other than the injured state is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another state if the obligation breached is owed to
the international community as a whole, i.e. an obligation erga
omnes.22 An example of an obligation erga omnes is a breach of the
right to self-determination.23 Any state entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another state can claim cessation of the
internationally wrongful act, and seek assurances and guarantees of
non-repetition and reparation. It may therefore be possible for a
third state to invoke Israel's responsibility for prohibiting the
Palestinian people from exercising their right to self-determination
(or for breaching another peremptory norm of international law if
applicable), although it would be necessary to establish a
jurisdictional link.

21. According to a study published in 2007, Article 42 of Articles of
Responsibility had received no judicial mention since the adoption of the Articles in
2001. See Simon Olleson, The Impact of the ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 249 (2007), available at http://www.biicl.org/files/3107
impactofthe articlesonstate-responsibilitypreliminarydraftfinal.pdf.
22. There has been some judicial mention of Article 48, but nothing enlightening.
See id. at 263-66.
23. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 278 (2002).
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So long as the international community does not consider
Palestine a state, the prospect of bringing a contentious case against
Israel is bleak. Even assuming first, that Palestine is a state and
second, that it is possible to bring a case against Israel on the basis,
for example, of the infringement of a multilateral human rights treaty
to which both Israel and Palestine are parties, and third, that neither
state has submitted a reservation to that treaty, any decision in a
contentious case would have no binding force except between the
parties and in respect to that particular case. 24 In the event of a
decision favorable to Palestine, it would not be surprising if Israel
were to refuse to abide by the decision. In such a situation, it would
be necessary to apply to the UN Security Council for enforcement of
the decision.25 As that body has consistently avoided criticizing
Israel's infringements of international law in the last four decades, it
is unlikely that an ICJ decision, assuming that it is favorable to
Palestine, would be enforced against Israel.26
B. Arbitration
Nonetheless, the ICJ is not the only international dispute
resolution mechanism that may prove of use to the Palestinians. It
would also be possible to resort to arbitration if Israel were agreeable,
and if the arbitration were related to an issue on which there is a
In this
treaty obligation between Israel and another state.
connection, Israel's peace treaty with Egypt and its peace treaty with
Jordan provide that any dispute that cannot be settled between the
parties by negotiation is to be resolved by conciliation or submitted to
arbitration." The PCA, which is based in the Peace Palace in The
Hague, is a body that administers arbitrations, and is often used by
states. Akin to cases brought before the ICJ, the results of any

24. Article 59 of the ICC statute provides "the decision of the Court has no
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
25. U.N. Charter, art. 94(2).
26. This was exemplified most recently in the United States veto of the draft
settlement resolution in February 2011. See draft S.C. Res. 2011/24, (Feb. 18, 2011)
(vetoed by the United States).
27. See Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty, Isr.-Egypt, art. 7(2), Mar. 26, 1979, 1252
U.N.T.S., and Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, Isr.-Jordan, art. 29(2), Oct. 26, 1994, 2042
U.N.T.S. 59.
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arbitration would only be binding upon the parties to the dispute.28
Egypt resolved a dispute with Israel at the PCA in the 1988 Taba
arbitration.2 9 Jordan could use the services of the PCA to raise those
sections of its peace treaty with Israel on refugees and on Jerusalem if
it turns out that Israel is not fully abiding by its obligations. However,
Israel would have to agree to arbitration as a means to resolve any
dispute that arises from these treaty provisions. The PLO and Israel
could have engaged in arbitration on the basis of Article XV of the
Declaration of Principles (1993) and Article XXI of the Cairo
Agreement (1995) in the event of a dispute arising with respect to
these agreements, and in the event that conciliation failed.30
However, Israel and the PLO have not exercised this right.
C. Advisory Opinions
The obstacles to engaging Israel in a contentious case or
resolving a dispute by recourse to arbitration might explain why the
UN Diplomacy memo concentrated mainly on the procedure for
referring advisory opinions to the ICJ. This would also explain why
most of the calls from the Special Rapporteurs were for advisory
opinions. The UN Diplomacy memo explains "the United Nations
General Assembly and Security Council may request advisory
opinions on 'any legal question."' Other United Nations organs and
specialized agencies which have been authorized to seek advisory
opinions can only do so with respect to "legal questions arising within
the scope of their activities."" An example relevant in the present
context is the question formulated by the UN General Assembly
regarding the advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Wall

28. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes art. 84, Oct
18, 1907, 1 Bevans 577; and Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes art. 56, July 29, 1899, 1 Bevans 230.
29. See Egypt-Israel Arbitration Tribunal: Award in Boundary Dispute
Concerning the Taba Area, 27 I.L.M 1421-38 (1988).
30. See art. 15 of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1533 (1993) and art. 21 of the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept.
28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551, 566 (1997). See also, GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE OSLO
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE
ACCORDS:
AGREEMENTS 120 (2000) (observing that Israel and the PA did not use the dispute

resolution mechanism in the Oslo Accords).
31. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

2012]

Litigating Palestine Before International Courts and Tribunals

137

opinion).32 Another example is the question formulated by the UN
General Assembly regarding the Applicability of the Obligation to
Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters

Agreement, which concerned a dispute between the United States and
the UN, when the United States attempted to close Palestine's
Permanent Observer Mission to the UN in 1988.33
The UN Diplomacy memo describes the procedure for seeking
advisory opinions from the General Assembly in these words: "For
decisions by the General Assembly, a simple majority vote is usually
required, but for decisions on 'important questions,' a two-thirds
majority is required, excluding abstentions."34 The document notes
that, "The definition of 'important questions' in Art. 18(2) of the UN
Charter is not entirely clear, but it is possible that questions regarding
the Israel-Palestinian conflict would meet the threshold of 'important
questions' and therefore require a two-thirds majority of participating
voters." Nonetheless, whilst UN practice is not clear on what it
considers to be "important questions" requiring a two-thirds majority
vote of members present in the Assembly and voting, it does stipulate
that questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security would be considered an important question." According to
one commentary to the UN Charter most decisions taken under
Article 18 do not indicate whether the members were aware that the
voting procedure for "important questions" applied. One of the
commentaries to the Charter noted that considerations as to whether
a question is an important one requiring a two-thirds majority vote is
often of a political rather than legal nature.3 6
Past questions referred to the ICJ for advisory opinions do not
shed much light on whether a simple majority or a two-thirds majority
vote is required for seeking an advisory opinion. For instance, the
UN General Assembly resolution concerning the question that was
referred to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion was
passed by a simple majority, with seventy-eight states voting in favor

32. Wall opinion, supra note 7, at 164, T 66 (July 9, 2004).
33. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United
Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 12
(Apr. 26, 1988).
34. UN Diplomacy memo, supra note 19, at 3.
35. U.N. Charter, art. 18(2).
36. BRUNO SIMMA THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 357
(Simma ed. 2002).
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of the resolution to forty-three votes against.37 In contrast, the UN
General Assembly resolution concerning the question on whether the
unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo was in accordance
with international law was passed by a two-thirds majority with
seventy-seven states voting in favor of the resolution to only six votes
against.18 Similarly, the UN General Assembly resolution concerning
the Wall opinion was passed by ninety states voting in favor to eight
against.3 9 These resolutions do not indicate whether the two-thirds
majority was required for these resolutions to pass or whether it was
because states strongly supported recourse to the ICJ in these
instances, which might explain why they attained a two-thirds
majority so easily.
Due to the large support in Africa, Asia, and Latin America for
the Palestinian people's struggle for self-determination under
international law, it should be relatively simple for the PLO to secure
a two-thirds majority vote to render a question before the ICJ in the
form of an advisory opinion. In practical terms a two-thirds majority
means that the Palestinians would need to secure 127 votes in the
General Assembly. Of the 193 states who at the time of writing this
Article are UN members, most are from the Middle East, Africa, and
Asia.40 Even if the United States, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
Palau, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the twenty-seven members
of the EU, and the dozen islands in the Pacific Ocean that usually
vote with Australia, vote against the request, this would still leave
over 127 states favorably inclined to support a Palestinian request for
an advisory opinion. Provided that the representatives of all these
states are present for the vote, the Palestinians should face little
difficulty in lobbying two-thirds of the General Assembly to support
their cause in order to pass a resolution containing a request for an
advisory opinion from the ICJ.

37. G.A. Res. 49/75 (Jan. 9, 1995). Voting records can be accessed on the United
Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS) by inserting the document
symbol of the UN resolution in the search engine. Abstentions are not counted as
votes in the assessment of a simple or two-thirds majority vote.
38. G.A. Res. 63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008).
39. G.A. Res. ES-10/14 (Dec. 8, 2003).
40. South Sudan became a member state of the UN on July, 14, 2011. See G.A.
Res. 65/308 (Aug. 25, 2011).
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III. The Prospects of Success and the Perils of Failure
The current composition of the UN General Assembly contrasts
starkly with its original composition when it was established in 1945.41
Then, the Assembly was dominated by the colonial powers.42 In 1947,
a resolution sponsored by Egypt and Syria concerning the legality of
the UN Partition Plan was prevented from being referred to the ICJ
by a single negative vote cast in an Assembly dominated by Cold War
politics.43 Whether or not the failure to refer the matter of partition
to the ICJ in 1947 had any discernable impact on later PLO policy,
the reticence that the Palestinian leadership has displayed towards
referring certain aspects of its dispute with Israel to international
legal bodies is striking. This reticence became particularly galling
during decolonization when the composition of the UN General
Assembly was dramatically transformed with the addition of many
new states from Africa and Asia who had a shared history with the
Palestinian people in their struggle against colonialism." Perhaps this
reticence can be attributed to a faulty understanding of the
international legal system, bad legal advice, a preference for armed
struggle and revolution, cultural ambivalence towards international

41. The original members of the UN included Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Republic, Poland,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South
Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.
42. In November 1947, the UN was comprised of fifty-five member states, and
therefore a proposal could be blocked by nineteen adverse votes if every delegation
cast a vote. For an analysis of the UN vote on partition and the Plan's legal aspects
see KATTAN FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST, supra note 2, at 146-68.

43. See Y.B. U.N. 241 (1947-48).
44. Between 1945 and 1964 when the PLO was founded, the following states had
attained UN membership: Afghanistan, Iceland, Siam, Sweden, Pakistan, Burma,
Yemen, Israel, Indonesia, Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania, Spain,
Japan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Ghana, Federation of Malaya, Guinea, Cameroun,
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus,
Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika,
Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Kenya, Kuwait,
Zanzibar, Malawi, Malta, Zambia.
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litigation, or a combination of all of these factors.45 Whatever the
case may be, the PLO's ambivalence towards international litigation
can be contrasted with the strategies adopted by the national
liberation movements in Southern Africa who routinely resorted to
international courts in their struggle against apartheid.46
On two occasions, the Palestine question found its way to The
Hague. The issue first arose indirectly during a legal dispute between
the UN Headquarters and the United States in 1988; it again emerged
directly in the case of the wall in 2004. In both cases, the Palestinians
emerged victorious. Of course it cannot be assumed that the
Palestinians would be as successful in any future cases brought before
the ICJ. Success largely depends on the circumstances surrounding
the request for the opinion and on the question asked. And indeed
asking the right question is absolutely crucial to success at the ICJ.
This is why caution ought to be exercised in formulating a question to
ask the UN General Assembly to refer to the ICJ in the form of an
advisory opinion. In this connection some of the calls referred to
earlier by the two UN Special Rapporteurs to ask for an advisory
opinion on "apartheid" or "ethnic cleansing," might not be the wisest
strategy, although at least in the case of apartheid there are three
international treaties that proscribe its practice, and which define and
penalize it as a crime."
Colonialism, unlike apartheid, has proved difficult to define both
in the social sciences and in international law. ' For instance, could
45. Interestingly, there was an attempt to create an Arab Court of Justice by the
Arab League in 1950 and there was also an attempt to create an Islamic International
Court of Justice by the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This may suggest
that the Arab and Islamic world do not believe that the International Court of Justice
is capable of fully appreciating and addressing inter-Arab disputes. See MICHELLE L.
BURGIs, BOUNDARIES OF DISCOURSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
MAPPING ARGUMENTS IN ARAB TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 91-93 (2009).

46. See Michla Pomerance, The ICJ and South-West Africa (Namibia): A
Retrospective Legal/PoliticalAssessment, 12 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 426 (1999).
47. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 3, G.A. Res. 2106 (Dec. 21, 1965); Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov.
30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18, 1976); see also. ICC Statute,
supra note 6, art 7(1) (stipulating the crime of apartheid is a crime against humanity).
48. In this connection, I was one of a dozen international lawyers who
participated in the South African study on apartheid and colonialism that I
mentioned in the Introduction. The study was funded by the South African
Government through the aegis of the Human Sciences Research Council. See supra
note 9 (for a list of the international lawyers who participated in the study). The
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the current "peace process" or the notion of "earned sovereignty" as
replicated in the UN Road Map (2003) not be defined as
"colonialism" or "neo-colonialism"? If so, I would expect that no
Western state would vote for a question that directly raises the matter
of colonialism in a question formulated for an ICJ advisory opinion.
Neither would the PA support such a move, especially since the legal
structure of its authority can be likened to a colonial entity in many
ways. Similarly, most of the Western educated members of the Court
might have difficulty with determining whether the ICJ would have
jurisdiction to entertain such a request. This is because it is necessary
for the question formulated for an advisory opinion to be a "legal
question" within the meaning of Article 96 of the Charter and Article
65 of the ICJ's Statute. Asking a question that makes reference to
colonialism in the context of a UN resolution that was adopted amidst
much Cold War controversy might be considered overtly political.49
Whilst the ICJ has repeatedly affirmed "that a question [which] has
political aspects does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a legal
question," a question that directly raises colonialism in a post-colonial
age might be a step too far.o This is especially as the ICJ can exercise
its discretion to refuse to respond to a request for an advisory
opinion, although it is rare for the Court to do so acting only in
exceptional circumstances where there are compelling reasons.
study was chaired by Professor John Dugard, who both as an academic and as an
advocate gained much experience challenging many of the policies of apartheid in
South Africa over several decades. For a personal reflection of his experiences, see
John Dugard's testimony to the Russell Tribunal on Palestine in Cape Town (Nov. 57, 2011), http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/ (forthcoming) (on file with
author). The study was the first serious and systematic attempt to apply the concept
of apartheid under international law to Israeli policy in the oPts. See Max du Plessis,
Seeking an Advisory Opinion on Israel's Apartheid and Colonial Practices in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories 34 S. AFRICAN Y.B. INT'L L. 169 (2009). Whilst I
agree with most of the study's specific conclusions and with the apartheid analogy to
the West Bank and Gaza I would, upon reflection, think twice before asking the
question that we specifically composed for the General Assembly to seek an advisory
opinion from the ICJ. See Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A re-assessment of
Israel'spractices,supra note 9, at 294. My concern is primarily about the reference to
"colonialism" rather than to apartheid.
49. See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N.
Doc. A14684 (1961).
50. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 27 and cases
cited therein (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter Kosovo Advisory Opinion].
51. See id. TT 30-31 and cases cited.
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Instead of focusing on the issue of colonialism, it would be more
practical to address apartheid, which is specifically prohibited by both
customary international law and treaty law. In this regard, it would
be more prudent to raise the question of apartheid indirectly by
asking a question that would require the interpretation of treaties
regarding human rights and racial discrimination in a situation where
there is a denial of self-determination. This would be particularly apt
in a situation of prolonged occupation. In this way, even if the
majority of judges at the ICJ avoid addressing the apartheid question
directly, it would not prevent a few from raising it in a separate or
dissenting opinion. Such a situation might arise if Israel, for instance,
refuses to relinquish its control over the occupied territories after the
sixty-sixth session of the UN General Assembly when Palestine has
said it will seek membership of the UN. It must be remembered that
the ICJ is still a conservative institution known for its positivist
approach to international law through which it employs "constrained,
neutral language" in its decisions and advisory opinions.5 2 The ICJ
also has a tendency to shy away from controversy." Moreover, the
question of apartheid was never directly raised before the ICJ in the
Southwest Africa cases although it naturally formed the background
to the four advisory opinions and two attempts at contentious
litigation.54 It is one thing to ask the General Assembly to formulate
a resolution comparing Israel's occupation to apartheid, it is quite
another to ask the ICJ to do this. Furthermore, the General
Assembly has not even likened Israel's occupation of Palestine to
apartheid unlike in the case of Southwest Africa where it frequently
condemned apartheid.
In this regard, a question that would be taken more seriously by
the ICJ in the current political climate would be one that focuses on
the matter of Palestinian statehood. Assuming that Palestine's quest
for UN membership is successful during the sixty-sixth session of the
UN General Assembly, the most appropriate question to ask the ICJ
would be to enquire as to when Palestine became a state. This is
because UN membership does not determine statehood. Rather

52. See Burgis, supra note 45, at 266.
53. For instance, in the recent Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the ICJ dodged the
question it was asked on whether Kosovo's declaration of independence was in
accordance with international law by reformulating the question and concluding that
it did not breach any rule of international law.
54. Pomerance, supra note 46, at 428.
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admission to the UN is based on an assumption that the entity
seeking membership is already a state." At the time of writing this
article, it is not clear whether Palestine will seek full UN membership
or observer-state membership. The former status is subject to a
recommendation from the Security Council, whereas the latter can be
attained within the UN General Assembly where Palestine has more
support." If a request for an advisory opinion is formulated with a
view to ascertaining the exact moment Palestine attained statehood,
then reference could be made to the number of states that have
recognized Palestine and the date of recognition, to the definition of
statehood in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States (1930), and any relevant General Assembly and Security
Council resolutions.-5 Ascertaining the date that Palestine became a
state is important because this would have ramifications for the
matter of ICC jurisdiction, which is briefly examined below.
A. Legal Issues Arising from Palestine's Quest to Achieve Statehood
Whilst it is impossible to predict the future, a number of complex
legal issues arising from the quest to achieve membership in the UN
of a Palestinian state are foreseeable. Problems may arise, for
instance, with regards to the matter of UN membership. If Palestine
seeks full UN membership, and if its request is either vetoed in the
Security Council or fails to pass due to a lack of support, then
Palestine may seek to "upgrade" its status in the UN General
Assembly." If Palestine decides to pursue the latter option then it
may be subject to a legal challenge. This is because the ICJ, in an
early opinion, ruled that the admission of a state to membership of
the UN, pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Charter, could not be effected
by a decision of the General Assembly when the Security Council has
made no recommendation for admission, by reason of the candidate

55. See U.N. Charter, art. 4(1) ("Membership in the United Nations is open to all
other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present
Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out
these obligations.").
56. See id. art. 4(2) ("The admission of any such state to membership in the
United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.").
57. See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933,49
Stat. 3097, T.S. 881.
58. Article 27(2) of the U.N. Charter provides "decisions of the Security Council
on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members."
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failing to obtain the requisite majority or due to a negative vote of a
permanent member upon a resolution so to recommend.5 9 Moreover,
even if Palestine does succeed in upgrading its status in the Assembly,
what legal rights and duties would such a state have under the UN
Charter? If Palestine's status continues to be questioned, it may also
be challenged when it seeks to accede, sign, and ratify bilateral and
multi-lateral treaties, because these are only things that states can do.
It may even be the case that some UN organs, and perhaps even the
ICC, will seek the ICJ's advice with a view to making an assessment
as to whether Palestine is competent to join their organization or
accede to specific treaties.
These are issues that the ICJ would be capable of answering, and
which would genuinely assist the UN with ascertaining whether
Palestine can become a member if the Security Council, for instance,
refuses to recommend its membership to the Assembly, due to
United States opposition) 0 In the event that the US does not block
Palestine's membership, and Palestine becomes a member of the UN,
an answer to the question of statehood may still be pertinent if Israel
refuses to relinquish control over the oPts. Indeed there may be
further grounds to challenge Israeli policy if it continues to populate
the settlements with its own citizens, either by expanding existing
settlements or constructing new ones, contrary to international law.6 1
This is because one of the outcomes of an ICJ opinion to the effect
that Palestine is a state is that Israel would be required to withdraw
from the territory, and cease its support for settlement activity,
because of its infringement of Palestine's sovereignty. Alternatively,
in anticipation of the opinion, Israel may act preemptively with a
grand gesture by terminating its occupation. It is, however, doubtful
whether Israel would actually withdraw beyond the wall, since it
would probably maintain full control of East Jerusalem, and it may
even carry out threats to annex the settlement blocs that are
contiguous to that city. 62
59. See Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 1950, 4, 10 (Mar. 3, 1950).
60. See Natasha Mozgovaya, U.S. House Opposes Unilateral Declaration of
PalestinianState, HAARETZ (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.haaretz.comlnews/ diplomacydefense/u-s-house-opposes-unilateral-declaration-of-palestinian-state-1.330922.
61. On the illegality of Israeli settlement activity, see Wall opinion, supra note 7,
at 136,183-84 120.
62. Ori Lewis, Israel could annex more of West Bank - Minister, REUTERS (Nov.
16, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/16/us-palestinians-
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IV. A Comment on the ICC
It will be recalled that the ICC memo previously mentioned in
Part II, which was leaked to Al Jazeera and The Guardiannewspaper
from the NSU files in Ramallah, addressed the possible legal
approaches that could be advanced by the PA at the ICC to protect
Palestinian rights. As the memo noted, the declaration lodged in the
Prosecutor's Office in the name of the Government of Palestine on
January 21, 2009, in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, was
predicated on the assumption "that Palestine is already a state."63
The memo added, "This is a potentially significant departure from the
position that the leadership has assumed since the early 1990s that a
Palestinian state will only emerge upon termination of the Israeli
occupation, and may have significant strategic implications for
permanent status negotiations." Confusion over the approach of the
Palestinian leadership's position on statehood is evident from the
submissions that were sent to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
on whether the declaration lodged by the PA met statutory
requirements." Those scholars and organizations that supported the
Israeli position in arguing that Palestine was not a state, relied on
comments by PA officials implying that they were in the process of
seeking statehood, whereas those who argued that Palestine was
already a state, said these statements were taken out of context.
This confusion is also reflected in the ICC memo. After
expressing concern over the PA's departure from its official position
that a Palestinian state would only emerge after the end of the
occupation, the memo set out the possible legal arguments that the
Palestinian leadership could invoke to support the declaration lodged
at the Prosecutor's Office "in order to avert a misinterpretation of the

israel-annexationidUSTRE5AFlHF20091116?feedType=RSS&feedName=
everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563 ("Israel warned the Palestinians on Monday
that declaring a state without concluding a peace agreement would lead to Israeli
counter-measures that could include annexation of more of the occupied West
Bank.").
63. See ICC memo, supra note 19, at 1.
64. See Summary of Submissions on Whether the Declaration Lodged by the
Palestinian National Authority Meets Statutory Requirements, WEBSITE OF THE ICC
PROSECUTOR (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE45B1-ACCO-B41706BB41E5/282852/PALESTINEFINAL201010272.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Michael Kearney, Palestine and the International Criminal Court:
Asking the Right Question, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1633975.
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Palestinian position by the Court." The memo suggested that the
leadership adopt the position that "Palestine enjoys functional
statehood for the application and implementation of international
humanitarian law and prosecution of war crimes." It cautioned the
leadership that, "irrespective of how the ICC, Israel and other states
react to a Palestinian assertion of statehood today, how the leadership
makes this assertion now could impact on the success of our overall
strategy and positions on permanent status issues in the future."67 The
fact that Mahmoud Abbas, the chairman of the PLO and President of
the PA, made it abundantly clear that Palestine will seek UN
membership in September, which he announced in The New York
Times, would seem to put this confusion to rest. The PA clearly
believes that Palestine is a state.
According to Article 13 of the ICC Statute, the court may
exercise its jurisdiction by one of three ways: First, referral by a state
party; second, referral by the Security Council; and third, the
Prosecutor may initiate his own investigation. In order for Palestine
to refer a situation to the Prosecutor in which one or more crimes
within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed, Palestine
must be a party to the ICC, and it can only become a party if it is a
state. In order for the Prosecutor to initiate his own investigation he
needs to be assured that the crimes complained of fall within the
jurisdiction of the court. 68 Again, this comes down to whether
Palestine was a state when the crimes complained of were alleged to
have been committed.
In this respect, it is unclear at what exact moment Palestine
became a state. One opinion is that it has been a state since its
Declaration of Independence in 1988, although the PLO lacked
control of territory at that particular moment.69 Since 1993, the PLO
has exercised authority in the West Bank and Gaza through the PA,
although it probably still fell short of satisfying the requirements of
66. ICC memo, supra note 19, at 2.
67. "This is because," the document continued, "the leadership's words and
deeds are evidence of how the PLO perceives Palestine's status under international
law and over time may even bind the PLO, and could affect a later consideration by
the ICC, another international organization or other state of the status of Palestine."
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
68. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, art. 15(1).
69. See Francis Boyle, The Creation of the State of Palestine 1 EUR. J. INT'L L.
301-06 (1990) and James Crawford, The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too much
too soon? 1 EUR. J. INT'L L., 307-13 (1990).
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statehood for most of the 1990s when the negotiations took place.70
In any event, the ICC Statute only entered into force on July 1, 2002.
The question then would seem to be at what moment did a
Palestinian state emerge between 2005, when a Palestinian state was
supposed to be established according to the UN Roadmap, and 2011,
when Abbas announced that Palestine would seek UN membership?
A successful application to become a UN member after September
will not resolve this question, since all UN membership tells us is that
Palestine is already a state. If Palestine becomes a member of the
UN, even if only as an observer state through a vote in the UN
General Assembly, the Prosecutor will no longer be able to ignore the
declaration lodged in the name of the Government of Palestine at his
Office on January 21, 2009." That declaration stipulated that, "the
Government of Palestine ... recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court
for the purpose of identifying, prosecuting and judging the authors
and accomplices of acts committed on the territory of Palestine since
July 1, 2002."72
V. Conclusion
Whether Palestine can pursue Israelis accused of war crimes
before the ICC, or bring a case against Israel before the ICJ, or ask a
third state to raise issues on its behalf before the PCA, all comes
down to whether Palestine is a state. The Prosecutor of the ICC
probably believes that his office is not the appropriate authority to
decide this question, which would explain the silence of his Office
regarding the declaration that was lodged over two years ago. In the
event of a problem arising in connection with an assertion of
statehood by the Palestinian leadership before the UN in September,
which may arise with respect to UN membership or perhaps through
an attempt by Palestine to accede to the ICC Statute, then an
opportunity might arise for the UN organ or specialized agency in
question to consider seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ.
70. See Omar M Dajani, Stalled Between Seasons: The InternationalLegal Status
of Palestine During the Interim Period, 26 DENV. J. OF INT'L L.& PoL'Y (2007). See
also THE ARAB-ISRAELI ACCORDS: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Eugene Cotran and Chibli
Mallat eds., 1996).
71. See ICC Statute, supra note 6, arts. 11(2) and 12(3),
72. See PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Declaration
Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-OFED-4481-95D4-C8071087102C/279
777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf.
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Should the ICJ decide that Palestine has indeed become a state then
one can be fairly certain that the ICC would not ignore an
authoritative opinion from the principal judicial organ of the UN.
Indeed, the challenge for the ICJ may not be with ascertaining
whether or not Palestine is a state, but rather at what exact moment
Palestine became a state, since this would affect the issue of ICC
jurisdiction. Whilst there is no guarantee that Israel would respond
positively to a UN vote or to a favorable advisory opinion that
recognized the state of Palestine, its occupation would become
untenable, as would its settlement policy.

